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http://www.jstor.orgPERCEIVED  RISK AND  THE MARGINAL  VALUE 
OF SAFETY 
Douglas  Gegax,  Shelby  Gerking,  and  William  Schulze* 
Abstract-Two contributions  are made toward  understanding 
variation  in marginal  value of safety estimates from labor 
market studies. First, marginal  safety values are obtained 
from direct measurement  of workers'  perceived  job-related 
accidental  death rates. Second, wage-risk relationships  are 
explored  for several  categories  of workers  using the hedonic 
price method. Statistically  significant  relationships  found for 
unionized, blue collar, and blue collar-unionized workers 
imply marginal  safety values of  1.5, 1.18, and 2.10 million 
dollars,  respectively.  Further  results  in this paper  suggest  that 
alternative  methods are needed to measure  marginal  safety 
values  for workers  in other categories. 
I.  Introduction 
M  sARGINAL  value of safety estimates from 
labor market studies exhibit substantial 
variation.  The marginal  value of  safety for the 
average  worker  considered  by Thaler and Rosen 
(1975) was approximately  $578,000  (in 1983 dol- 
lars) while Garen (1988), after adjusting  for po- 
tential endogeneity  of job risk, found the corre- 
sponding  value to be about $9.2 million (in 1983 
dollars). This range increases still further when 
particular  -types of  workers are  analyzed. In 
Olson's (1981) study, unionized workers had a 
marginal  value of safety of nearly $17 million (in 
1983 dollars)  whereas Dorsey and Walzer (1983) 
presented an equation in which the correspond- 
ing value for nonunion workers is negative and 
statistically  significant.  These anomalous  findings 
for nonunion  workers  in addition to the general 
divergence  in marginal  value of safety estimates 
have complicated  formulation  of government  pol- 
icy and have initiated debates concerning  which 
estimates  are best supported,  how seemingly  vast 
differences  between them can be explained;  and 
whether  the market  for safety has failed. 
This paper makes two contributions toward 
further understanding of  these  issues.  First, 
marginal  safety values are obtained from direct 
measurements  of workers'  perceived  job-related 
accidental death risk. Risk perception data to- 
gether  with detailed information  on labor market 
characteristics  are collected by mail from a na- 
tional random  sample  of U.S. residents.  Although 
perceptions  are difficult  to measure  and question- 
naires are imperfect measurement  instruments, 
the risk data collected still are arguably  superior 
to those used in previous labor market studies. 
With  few exceptions,  previous  estimates  are based 
on fatal accident risks measured  as industrial  or 
occupational  averages.  Yet, perceived  death risks 
may differ  from actual death risks and particular 
jobs have greater  or lesser risks than these aver- 
ages. 
Second, wage-risk relationships  are explored 
for several  categories  of workers  using the hedo- 
nic price method. Using the perceived risk mea- 
sure, statistically  significant  relationships  found 
for  unionized, blue  collar,  and  blue  collar- 
unionized  workers  imply  marginal  safety  values of 
$1.58 million, $1.18 million,  and $2.10 million (in 
1983  dollars),  respectively.  These values are lower 
by factors of between five and seven compared 
with those obtained using average  industry  fatal' 
accident rates. In hedonic wage regressions  for 
white collar and nonunionized  workers,  however, 
coefficients  of perceived  risk are not significant  at 
conventional  levels. 
II.  Data 
Data were collected by a national mail survey 
during  the summer  of 1984  using  Dillman's  (1978) 
total design method. Survey  materials  were sent 
to: (1) a random  sample of 3,000 U.S. household 
heads and (2) 3,000 additional household heads 
randomly  selected from 105 counties which have 
disproportionately  large concentrations  of high- 
risk industries. In  the  second component, the 
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sample included  an equal number  of households 
from the northeast,  northcentral,  west and south 
regions  of the United States. Of the 6,000 ques- 
tionnaires  mailed, 749 (12.5%)  were returned  as 
undeliverable  and a total of 2,103 were returned 
in completed form. Thus, the net response rate 
was approximately  40%. Not all completed  ques- 
tionnaires,  however,  could be used in the empiri- 
cal analysis reported in section III. Responses 
were excluded from household heads who: (1) 
were retired,  unemployed  or otherwise  not in the 
labor force, (2) received more than 20% of total 
income  from transfer  payments,  (3) worked  fewer 
than 1250 hours in 1983, (4) were self-employed, 
and (5) did not report  their income. These exclu- 
sions reduced  the number  of useable responses  to 
737  observations.' (See  Gerking, deHaan and 
Schulze (1988) for a more detailed discussion  of 
the sample  and the questionnaire.2) 
Several types of  information were  obtained 
from  each respondent.  First,  the survey  measured 
each household head's perceived risk of a fatal 
accident on his main job (RISK). Respondents 
were shown an illustration  of a ladder with ten 
equally  spaced  steps. Each step denoted the num- 
ber of annual  job-related  fatal accidents  per 4,000 
workers  and seven example  occupations  from the 
Thaler and Rosen study  were placed on the lad- 
der  according to  their average levels of  job- 
related risk of death. Respondents specified the 
step number  that they felt most closely approxi- 
mated risk  of accidental  death on their main  jobs. 
Since the Thaler and Rosen examples  were nar- 
rowly defined occupations,  they had the advan- 
tage of offering the respondent clear reference 
points. Their use, however, had one  potential 
shortcoming.  Risks associated with these exam- 
ples were based on actuarial  data reporting  ex- 
cess deaths by occupation,  a portion  of which are 
associated with non job-related risk. This may 
have caused respondents to  overestimate their 
risk of accidental  death. 
Table 1 shows means, standard  deviations,  and 
numbers of  observations available for the  full 
sample and for eight subsamples.  White collar 
workers  (WHITE)  were managers,  administrators, 
or professional  and technical  workers.  Remaining 
workers were classified as blue collar (BLUE). 
UNION denotes membership  in a labor union. 
These subsamples  were selected in light  of persis- 
tent empirical  differences  in marginal  safety val- 
ues  between  white  and  blue  collar  workers 
(Viscusi, 1979) and between u,nion  members  and 
nonmembers.  As shown  in the table, average  risk 
of  accidental death at work perceived by blue 
collar workers  is about double that perceived  by 
white collar workers  and the mean of RISK for 
union  members  is approximately  50%  greater  than 
for  nonunion members. Unionized blue  collar 
workers had the  highest average level of  per- 
ceived risk (3.922 in 4,000) while nonunionized 
white collar  workers  had the lowest average  levels 
of perceived  risk (1.683 in 4,000). 
These  perceived risk measures are  roughly 
comparable  to certain non-work  related fatal ac- 
cidents. Starr (1969) estimates the risks (fatali- 
ties/person-hour of  exposure) associated with 
natural disasters  (10-"1'), firearms  (10-9), smok- 
ing (10-6),  and automobiles (10-6).  Given an 
average  of 2000 hours worked per year, the full 
sample mean for RISK implies 3 x  10-7  fatali- 
ties/person-hour of exposure. 
RISK has two features that warrant further 
explanation. (1) This variable may be  a  more 
accurate  measure of individual  self-assessed  risk 
of death at work  than average  industry  or occupa- 
tion-based fatal accident rate variables used in 
previous  empirical research.  Several  authors 
TABLE  l.-MEANS  AND  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  OF  RISK 
BY  SUBSAMPLE 
RISK 
Standard 
Subsample  N  Mean  Deviation 
UNION-BLUE  178  3.922  2.498 
UNION-WHITE  50  1.735  1.904 
NONUNION-BLUE  217  2.969  .2.284 
NONUNION-  292  1.683  1.311 
WHITE 
ALL UNION  228  3.443  2.544 
ALL NONUNION  509  2.232  1.899 
ALL WHITE  342  1.691  1.410 
ALL BLUE  395  3.400  2.426 
FULL SAMPLE  737  2.606  2.191 
I Evidence  exists that the final sample of 737 observations 
may not be completely  representative  of the general  popula- 
tion. In a paper using these same data, Dickie and Gerking 
(1987) note a recurring  mail survey  outcome that response 
rates are higher from more educated persons with higher 
incomes. 
2An  appendix  is available  from the lead author that pro- 
vides:  (1) a copy of the questionnaire,  (2) and explanation  of 
how all variables  were constructed,  and (3) tables of results 
for all regressions  described.  A diskette containing  the raw 
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including  Viscusi  (1979)  and  Marin  and 
Psacharopoulos  (1982) have argued that average 
fatal accident  rates for industrial  or occupational 
categories may neither accurately  reflect worker 
perceptions of the risks they face nor apply to 
workers  whose risks differ from the average.  (2) 
RISK is similar  to a variable  used by Viscusi and 
O'Connor  (1984) in their study of the chemical 
industry.  RISK, however,  measures  perceived  fa- 
tal accident probabilities,  whereas Viscusi and 
O'Connor  were concerned  with perceived  rates of 
illnesses and injuries. Additionally, RISK is  a 
disaggregated  version of the DANGER dummy 
variable  used by Viscusi (1979) and Viscusi and 
Moore (1987) wherein DANGER takes the value 
of 1 if a worker  cites job-related  health or safety 
risks. In  the  p,resent study, RISK is  used  in 
marginal  value of safety calculations,  while Vis- 
cusi based his calculations  on a measure of fatal 
accident  rates by industry. 
Second, data on annual labor earnings,  exclu- 
sive of overtime pay, from the respondent's  pri- 
mary  job in calendar 1983 were combined with 
data,  on hours worked during the same year to 
yield an hourly  wage figure. This nominal wage 
variable was adjusted for regional price differ- 
ences to form the dependent  variable  (RWAGE) 
used in the hedonic labor market  analysis. 
The survey  also measures  respondent's  human 
capital  (H), work  environment  (W), and personal 
characteristics  (P).  While they are not a major 
focus of the analysis, an example presented by 
Dickens (1984) suggests  that these measures are 
crucial in isolating the wage premium received 
for working in  risky jobs. Individual variables 
measured  in H, W, and P are listed in table 2.3 
III.  Perceived Risk of the Value of Life: 
Hedonic Estimates 
Hedonic labor market analysis uses equation 
(1) 
RWAGE = f(RISK,  H, W, P).  (1) 
Holding  constant  the effects of H, W, and P, this 
equation  establishes  the market  equilibrium  locus 
between RWAGE and RISK given well-known 
assumptions.  Estimates of this equation for the 
full sample and eight subsamples  are presented 
below. 
Empirical  results  of estimating  a semi-logarith- 
mic version of  equation (1)  by ordinary feast 
squares  for the full sample are reported  in table 
2.4 As shown, the H,  W, and P  variables per- 
formed roughly  as expected  with generally  signif- 
icant coefficients and correct signs. The coeffi- 
cient of  RISK, however, was not significant  at 
conventional  levels, although  it had the expected 
sign (positive). Disregarding  the low  t-statistic, 
this coefficient implies an  illustrative marginal 
safety  value of $807,176  which  is near the low end 
of the range of estimates cited in the introduc- 
tion. This figure is obtained by (1) noting that 
d ln(RWAGE)/d  RISK =  .00815,  (2)  multiplying 
that figure  by an assumed  2,000 hours  of work  per 
year, (3) multiplying  the result by 4,000 (the de- 
nominator  of the risk measure)  ahd (4) multiply- 
ing again  by the average  level of RWAGE  in 1983 
dollars  ($12.38). 
Aside from the possibility  that the coefficient 
of  RISK is  truly zero, there are at least two 
reasons  why the perceived  risk  variable  may have 
performed poorly in  the  table  2  regression. 
First, as demonstrated  by Cropper, Deck, and 
McConnell  (1988),  poor performance  may  be due 
to misspecifying  the functional  form of the wage 
equation. As a consequence, the table 2 regres- 
sion was re-run using three alternate specifica- 
tions. (1) The dependent variable  was subjected 
to  a  Box and Cox (1962) transformation.  The 
estimated transformation  coefficient  was not sig- 
nificantly  different  from zero; the value implicitly 
assigned by assuming  a semi-logarithmic  model. 
(2) A quadratic  term in RISK was added to the 
table 2 regression. In this specification,  neither 
the coefficients of the linear nor the quadratic 
terms were significantly  different from zero. (3) 
RISK was disaggregated  into 10 dummy  variables 
indicating  the rung on the ladder marked  by the 
respondent.  None of these dummies had coeffi- 
cients significant  at conventional  levels. The data, 
3 One of the referees pointed  out that related studies have 
included  a measure  of worker  compensation  benefits in the 
hedonic  wage  equation  (e.g., Viscusi  and Moore,  1987;  Dorsey 
and Walzer,  1983).  These authors  argue  that the worker  can 
be compensated  for  job-related  risks  ex ante through  compen- 
sating  wage differentials  or by insurance  arrangements  provid- 
ing ex post cash  payments.  Questions  about  worker  compensa- 
tion benefits  would have been appropriate  to the survey  and 
lack of  these data represents a possible deficiency  in this 
study. 
4Since  the sample  was composed  of data drawn  from two 
different  populations,  a Chow  (1960) test was carried  out on 
the table 2 equation  to determine  whether  pooling  was war- 
ranted.  The null hypothesis  of equality  between the two sets 
of slope coefficients  was not rejected  at the 5% level. TABLE  2.-EFFECr  OF PERCEIVED  RISK  ON LN(RWAGE)a 
Explanatory  Coefficient 
Variable  Definition  (t-statistic) 
A. Risk  Variable 
RISK  Perceived  risk  of a fatal  accident  at work.  Takes  on an  0.00815 
integer  value  from  1 to 10  deaths  per 4,000  workers  (1.07) 
annually. 
B. Human  Capital  Variables 
SCHOOL  1  1 if schooling  ended in grades  1-8; 0 otherwise.  -0.292 
(-2.76) 
SCHOOL  2  1 if schooling  ended in grades  9-11; 0 otherwise.  -0.216 
(-2.67) 
SCHOOL  3  1 if schooling  ended in grade  12;  0 otherwise.  -0.166 
(-3.12) 
SCHOOL  4  1 if schooling  ended  with  a trade  school  program;  0  -0.77 
otherwise.  (-  1.20) 
SCHOOL  5  1 if schooling  ended  with  some college;  0 otherwise.  -0.107 
(-2.29) 
SCHOOL  6  1 if schooling  ended  with BS or BA and/or graduate  training  b 
or degrees;  0 otherwise. 
YRSPO  Years  worked  in present  occupation.  - 0.0013 
(-0.680) 
YRSFT  Years  worked  full-time  since age 18.  0.0066 
(1.76) 
YRSPE  Years  worked  for present  employer.  0.0079 
(3.96) 
C. Work  Environment  Variables 
RQSCHL1  1 if 0-8 years  of schooling  are required  for present  job;  0  -0.273 
otherwise.  (-2.91) 
RQSCHL2  1 if 9-11 years  of schooling  are required;  0 otherwise.  -0.233 
(-2.74) 
RQSCHL3  1 if 12 years  of schooling  are required;  0 otherwise.  -0.117 
(-2.16) 
RQSCHL4  1 if some  college is required;  0 otherwise.  -0.110 
(-2.13) 
RQSCHL5  1 if one or more  college  degrees  are required;  0 otherwise.  b 
WKEXP  1 if work  experience  or special  training  required  for present  0.080 
job;  0 otherwise.  (2.00) 
SUPER  Number  of persons  supervised  on primary  job.  0.00043 
(2.44) 
GOVT  1 if public  sector  employee;  0 otherwise.  -0.034 
(-0.892) 
UNION  1 if union  member;  0 otherwise.  0.091 
(2.61) 
YRSQUAL  Years  required  to become  fully  trained  and/or qualified  on  0.024 
primary  job.  (5.06) 
MILES  Road  mileage  from  home  to place  of work.  0.0026 
(2.56) 
NUMBER  Number  of employees  at primary  work  place.  0.000030 
(3.28) 
CENTRAL  1 if primary  job site is in a central  city  or suburban  area;  0  0.061 
otherwise.  (1.72) 
SERVICE  1 if employed  as a service  worker;  0 otherwise.  -0.201 
(-3.15) 
LABOR  1 if employed  as a laborer;  0 otherwise.  0.0028 
(0.040) 
TRANS  1 if employed  as a transportation  operator;  0 otherwise.  - 0.060 
(-0.685) 
EQUIP  1 if employed  as an equipment  operator;  0 otherwise.  - 0.071 
(-0.974) 
CRAFT  1 if employed  as a craft  worker;  0 otherwise.  - 0.095 
(-1.69) 
CLERIC  1 if employed  as a clerical  worker;  0 otherwise.  -0.130 
(-1.78) 
SALES  1 if employed  as a sales  worker;  0 otherwise.  -  0.089 
(-1.36) 
MANAGE  I if employed  as a manager  or administrator;  0 otherwise.  -0.011 
(-0.256) 
PROF  I if employed  as a professional  or technical  worker;  0  b 
otherwise 
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TABLE  2.-(continued) 
Explanatory  Coefficient 
Variable  Definition  (t-statistic) 
D. Personal  Characteristic  Variables 
AGE  Years  of age.  -0.0014 
(-0.374) 
RACE  1 if white;  0 otherwise.  0.017 
(0.292) 
SEX  1 if male;  0 otherwise.  0.192 
(4.50) 
DISAB  1 if physical  or nervous  conditions  limit  amount  or type  of  - 0.065 
work  that can be done;  0 otherwise.  (-1.26) 
VET  1 if respondent  is veteran.  0.042 
(1.24) 
LIVE  1 if respondent  lives  in a central  city  or suburban  area;  0  - 0.091 
otherwise.  (-2.72) 
CONSTANT  2.07 
(11.25) 
aR2  =  ().42. 
hDenotes  omitted  dummy  variable. 
then, provide  little evidence  that the market  equi- 
librium RWAGE-RISK  locus is misspecified in 
the full sample  regression. 
A second explanation  for poor performance  of 
RISK lies in possible  differences  between  occupa- 
tional groups that are masked when the entire 
sample is considered. Separate regressions  were 
estimated for the  eight subsamples defined in 
table 1. Selected results are presented in  the 
left-hand portion of table 3 showing  coefficients 
and  t-statistics of  RISK. A  Chow (1960) test 
statistic of  F(83,618) = 1.456 indicates that the 
null  hypothesis of  no  wage  structure shifts 
over  the  UNION-BLUE,  UNION-WHITE, 
NONUNION-BLUE,  and  NONUNION-WHITE 
subsamples  can be rejected  at the 5% level. Table 
3  shows that in  the  UNION-BLUE  and  ALL 
UNION regressions,  the coefficient of  RISK is 
positive and statistically  significant  at less than 
the 22% level using a 1-tail  test and is significant 
at the 5% level using a 1-tail test in the ALL- 
BLUE regression. In  the  nonunion equations, 
coefficients  of RISK have small t-statistics.  Thus, 
only union members  and blue collar workers  ap- 
parently  are able to capture  a wage premium  for 
accepting  greater  levels  of  perceived  risk; 
marginal  value of safety  estimates  for these work- 
ers are: (1)  MVS(UNION-BLUE)  = $2,103,120, 
(2)  MVS(ALL UNION) = $1,580,544, and  (3) 
MVS(ALL  BLUE) = $1,180,304.5  Also, similar  to 
the results of Viscusi (1979) who used average 
industry  risk,  the perceived  risk  variable  performs 
better in the ALL BLUE regression  than in the 
ALL  WHITE regression. 
Results highlighting  the role of unions  in secur- 
ing a  compensating  wage differential for fatal 
accident  risks  are common  in the empirical  litera- 
ture  (Marin and  Psacharopoulos (1982)  and 
Dillingham  and Smith (1983) are notable excep- 
tions). Viscusi (1979) has argued that because 
unions are more or less permanent  institutions, 
they are better able to accumulate  and dissemi- 
nate information  about safety hazards than are 
individual  workers who frequently change jobs. 
Moreover,  collective bargaining  provides oppor- 
tunities to  negotiate financial tradeoffs for job 
safety, an important  aspect if safety is a quasi- 
public  good for which  individuals  understate  their 
true preferences. 
A  related explanation for  the  difference in 
performance  of risk across  subsamples  lies in the 
lower mean values of this variable reported by 
nonunion as compared  with union members  (see 
table 1). By serving  as a conduit for information, 
unions  may  heighten  awareness  of safety  hazards, 
but the possibility-  remains that they represent 
workers in  the  most risky jobs. For  example, 
workers  in the ALL NONUNION  subsample  had 
a relatively  low mean value of RISK and 81% of 
these workers  reported  a value for RISK lying  on 
the first  three steps of the risk ladder.  Therefore, 
RISK may have insufficient  variation  to precisely 
estimate a coefficient of this variable.  Also, the 
marginal  product of fatal accident risk may be 
sThe  calculations  shown are made using the mean 1983 
wage for each group, rather  than the average  wage for the 
entire  sample.  These means  are:  (1) $11.43  for UNION-BLUE, 
(2) $11.76  for ALL UNION,  and (3) $10.39  for ALL BLUE. 594  THE REVIEW  OF ECONOMICS  AND STATISTICS 
TABLE 3.-COEFFICIENTS  OF RISK AND FATAL 
FOR EIGHT SUBSAMPLES 
RISK  FATAL 
Subsample  Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic 
UNION-BLUE  0.0230  2.678b  0.4272  2.062b 
UNION-WHITE  0.0241  0.727  0.7712  0.923 
NONUNION-  0.0087  0.586  0.4104  1.385 
BLUE 
NONUNION-  -0.0180  -0.971  -0.2475  -0.732 
WHITE 
ALL UNION  0.0168  1.981b  0.5033  2.516b 
ALL  0.0028  0.241  0.0932  0.420 
NONUNION 
ALL WHITE  -0.0086  -0.538  -0.0953  -0.312 
ALL BLUE  0.0142  1.651a  0.4228  2.277b 
FULL  SAMPLE  0.00815  1.066  0.2636  1.638 
a Denotes significance  at the 5% level using a one-tail test. 
b Denotes significance  at the 2-1/2% level using a one-tail test. 
zero on many  white collar and nonunion  jobs. As 
a  result, if workers dislike risk,  ,firms will not 
supply this characteristic  and no wage premium 
exists for the hedonic method to measure. 
If white collar and nonunion members have 
positive marginal  values of safety which are not 
measured  by the hedonic  method,  sample  compo- 
sition is a serious issue. Hedonic marginal  value 
of safety estimates based on restricted samples 
actually  may be more useful than those based on 
a national random  sample. Alternative  methods, 
such as contingent  valuation in which the com- 
pensation-risk tradeoff is assessed directly,  may 
be  superior in assessing the marginal  value of 
safety of workers exposed to low levels of risk. 
Gerking, deHaan, and Schulze (1988) find that 
contingent  valuation  bids for reduced  job-related 
fatal accident  risk are roughly  equal for union vs. 
nonunion  members  and for white collar vs. blue 
collar  workers. 
IV.  Comparison  with an Average  Industry 
Risk Measure 
The above estimates are compared  with those 
obtained  from a more traditional  measure  of fatal 
accident  rates (FATAL)  obtained  from Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics  data on work-related  deaths per 
thousand employees in SIC two-digit  industries. 
FATAL  was  matched  to sample  respondents  based 
on their industry  of employment  and substituted 
for RISK in regressions  specified  otherwise  iden- 
tically to  those  previously reported. A  least 
squares  regression  of RISK on FATAL  yields 
RISK=  2.11  +  6.94FATAL;  R2=  .093 
(22.1)  (8.6)  (2) 
where t-statistics  are shown  in parentheses.  Thus, 
RISK is positively  related to FATAL  at conven- 
tional significance levels; however, variation in 
FATAL explains only about 9% of variation in 
RISK. 
4 
The right-hand  portion of table 3 presents co- 
efficients and  t-statistics of  FATAL which are 
similar to corresponding  results for RISK. For 
example, based  on  -a  Chow-test statistic  of 
F(83,618) = 1.437,  the  null  hypothesis of  no 
structural  shifts in the wage equation across the 
UNION-BLUE,  UNION-WHITE,  NONUNION- 
BLUE,  and  NONUNION-WHITE  subsamples 
again is rejected at the 5% level. Also, the coef- 
ficients  of  FATAL  in  the  UNION-BLUE,  ALL 
UNION,  and ALL BLUE regressions  are signifi- 
cantly different from zero at least at 5%, while 
coefficients  of FATAL  are insignificant  in all other 
regressions.  Thus, the coefficients  of FATAL  and 
RISK are significantly  different  from zero in the 
same three subsamples.' 
Marginal  value of safety estimates using FA- 
TAL are roughly  five to seven times larger than 
those obtained  using RISK.  Considering  the three 
cases where coefficients  of FATAL  were signifi- 
cant at 5%: 
(1) MVS(UNION-BLUE) =  $9,761,220, 
(2) MVS(ALL  UNION)  =  $11,837,610, and 
(3) MVS(ALL BLUE)  =  $8,785,784. PERCEIVED  RISK AND  THE MARGINAL  VALUE  OF SAFETY  595 
In  comparison, Viscusi's (1979, p.  249) LOG- 
EARNING  results for blue collar workers  based 
on industry death risk imply a marginal safety 
value of  about $2.8 million (in  1983 dollars). 
However, the discrepancy  between this estimate 
and the corresponding  one implied in table 3 is 
explained partly by differences in mean annual 
earnings  in the two samples.  In Viscusi's  sample, 
mean  annual earnings (in  1983 dollars) were 
$11,968,  whereas  in the present sample the mean 
hourly  blue collar wage ($10.68)  multiplied  by an 
assumed 2,000 hours of work per year yields a 
corresponding  value of $21,361.  A possible expla- 
nation for this difference is that individuals  in 
Viscusi's sample worked,  on average,  fewer than 
the 2,000 annual  hours assumed  here. 
Discrepancies  between marginal  value of safety 
estimates  using FATAL  and those obtained  using 
RISK parallel  those found in the literature.  The 
survey  instrument  used to obtain  the self-assessed 
RISK  measure  utilized  example  occupations 
based on actuarial  data while FATAL  was based 
on average  fatality  rates by industry.  The highest 
marginal  value of safety estimates generally are 
associated with industry-specific  risk measures 
and  the  'lowest estimates with  occupational- 
specific risk variables (Dillingham, 1985; Marin 
and Psacharopoulos,  1982). 
As mentioned above, individuals  in this study 
possibly overestimated levels of  risk faced (at 
least when compared to industry  average data) 
which in  turn led  to  lower marginal value of 
safety estimates.  However,  Dillingham  (1985) ar- 
gues that the  "best guess" range in  marginal 
value of safety estimates is $1.37-$2.74 million 
(in 1983 dollars).  Industry  risk measures such as 
FATAL  are based on average  employment  rather 
than full-time equivalent  with the former being 
greater than the  latter. Thus, average employ- 
ment based measures  would be expected to un- 
derstate risk (relative to  a full-time equivalent 
employment  measure)  suggesting  an upward  bias 
in resulting marginal  value of  safety estimates. 
Also, he found evidence that measures such as 
FATAL reflect industry-specific  effects in addi- 
tion to  fatal accident risk, thus leading to  an 
additional  source  of upward  bias in its coefficient. 
When Dillingham  included dummy  variables  for 
both industry  and occupation,  he found that the 
coefficient  of his fatal injury  rate variable  became 
insignificant.  This result also occurred  in the pre- 
sent study for subsample  regressions  using FA- 
TAL. Yet, when both industry and occupation 
dummies  are included in the UNION-BLUE  and 
ALL UNION subsample  regressions,  coefficients 
of RISK remain positive and significantly  differ- 
ent from zero at the 5% level using a one-tail 
test. Coefficient  values are 0.021 and 0.015, re- 
spectively.  The coefficient of RISK was positive 
but not significantly  different from zero at con- 
ventional levels when both sets of dummies are 
included in the  ALL BLUE subsample regres- 
sion. 
V.  Conclusion 
This paper reports marginal value of  safety 
estimates  based on a new data set collected from 
a national random sample mail survey of  U.S. 
household heads. An important feature of  this 
survey is that it directly measures respondent's 
perceived  risk of accidental  death on the job. 
Many  investigators  have deplored  the quality  of 
available  aggregate  industry  and occupational  risk 
data and have instead advocated  measuring  indi- 
vidual perceptions  of risk. Hedonic results indi- 
cate that for unionized  workers,  blue collar  work- 
ers,  and  unionized blue  collar  workers, the 
marginal  value of safety using the perceived risk 
measure lies  in  the  range $1.18-$2.10 million 
(1983 dollars). These results are roughly  consis- 
tent with Dillingham's  (1985) "best guess" range 
of $1.37-$2.74 million (in 1983 dollars),  but are 
substantially  lower than those obtained using an 
industry  average risk measure. For white collar 
and nonunionized  workers,  however,  the marginal 
value of safety is not significantly  different  from 
zero. Further  analysis  reveals  that the vast major- 
ity of  these workers perceive few, if  any, life 
threatening hazards on  their jobs.  Also,  the 
marginal  product of fatal accident risk may be 
zero on many  white collar and nonunion  jobs. As 
a  result, if workers dislike risk, firms will not 
supply this characteristic  and no wage premium 
exists for the hedonic method to measure.  Alter- 
native methods such  as  contingent valuation, 
therefore, are needed to measure the marginal 
value of safety for persons in low or no risk  jobs. 
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